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Abstract : The paper has a twofold aim. On the one hand, it provides what appears to be 
the first game-theoretic modeling of Napoleon’s last campaign, which ended dramatically 
on 18 June 1815 at Waterloo. It is specifically concerned with the decision Napoleon 
made on 17 June 1815 to detach part of his army against the Prussians he had defeated, 
though not destroyed, on 16 June at Ligny. Military historians agree that this decision 
was crucial but disagree about whether it was rational. Hypothesizing a zero-sum game 
between Napoleon and Blücher, and computing its solution, we show that it could have 
been a cautious strategy on the former's part to divide his army, a conclusion which runs 
counter to the charges of misjudgement commonly heard since Clausewitz. On the other 
hand, the paper addresses methodological issues. We defend its case study against the 
objections of irrelevance that have been raised elsewhere against “analytic narratives”, 
and conclude that military campaigns provide an opportunity for successful application of 
the formal theories of rational choice. Generalizing the argument, we finally investigate 
the conflict between narrative accounts – the historians' standard mode of expression – 
and mathematical modeling.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Once  launched  in  economics  and  its  attendant  disciplines,  theories  of  rational  choice 
spread  abundantly  beyond  this  original  realm.  An  entire  branch  of  experimental 
psychology is now devoted to them. Schools of sociology and political science align 
themselves with the theories, against others which reject them. Indeed, the resistance 
offered by these latter two disciplines has sparked well-known controversies, some of 
which have gone on to become academic topoi (think for instance of that which has 
wracked the sociology of education for years). But history has escaped this trend, even, 
so it would seem, in its critical form. Not only has the discipline been reluctant to make 
use of rational choice theories, but it has also shown itself little inclined to reflective 
debate  on  their  possible  applications.  Those  who  reject  cost-benefit  analyses  are  not 
likely to conduct one to see whether or not it is useful to do so. 
 
A few authors – actually more political scientists or economists than historians – would 
now  break  this  status  quo  by  promoting  “analytic  narratives”.  The  term,  which  has 
become  something  of  a  rallying  cry,  sounds  more  abstract  than  the  movement’s true 
objective,  which  is  primarily  to  apply  game  theory  to  traditional  topics  of  political 
history:  municipal  conflicts  in  medieval  Genoa,  the  tax  systems  of  prerevolutionary 
Europe,  conscription  laws  in  the  19
th  Century,  entry  of  new  states  to  the  American 
federation, regulation of the coffee exchange at the end of the 20
th Century. Such an 
exception  is  too  curious  to  pass  unnoticed.  But  it  has  hardly  generated  a  craze.  The 
methodology has been criticized on the grounds that, first, the historical cases have been 
ill-chosen, second that the models used to explain them do not adhere to the strictest 
norms of rational explanation, and third that these very norms themselves are dubious.
1 
 
The present paper also employs game theory to inform the study of history. It is another 
attempt to implement the “analytic narrative” methodology, but with a shift that its choice 
                                                 
1 The studies are due, respectively, to Greif, Rosenthal, Levi, Weingast and Bates. They have been brought 
together in Analytic Narratives (1998), which is a manifesto for the group. The three levels of criticisms are 
found in Elster, to whom the authors have replied; see this important controversy in the American Political 
Science Review (2000, p. 685-702).   3 
of a military topic will make clear. By and large, we would endorse the previous writers 
against objections of the second and third levels, arguing, as they forcefully did, that 
there is no obligation to be theoretically sophisticated in applied work, and that it is not 
very helpful in the present context to rehearse the classic problems of rational choice 
theories.
2 But objections of the first level are different, and here we certainly agree with 
the critics that few historical topics are amenable to “analytic narratives”. We propose the 
rule that the selection of cases be justified explicitly in terms of the questions the earlier 
historians have raised and the data they have left to answer them. Game theory should be 
connected with preexisting accounts of the usual style more tightly than has been done so 
far. As a companion rule, we propose that the author of an “analytic narrative” state also 
explicitly what he aims at eliciting from the historical material that cannot be obtained by 
ordinary narratives, and why this material calls for his specific modeling rather than any 
other. Again, the previous work appears to be somewhat elusive in this respect.   
 
With  these  guidelines  in  mind,  we  tried  the  “analytic  narrative”  methodology  on 
Napoleon’s last campaign in June 1815 - that which he eventually lost to Wellington and 
Blücher on the battlefield of Waterloo. One broad reason for this choice is that military 
studies have often served as a touchstone to rational choice explanation. That they are a 
fertile terrain for such activity has been suggested a number of times. For example, Pareto 
(1917-1919, §152) classes them among the few disciplines - along with economics and 
technology - that embody his concept of “logical action”. Among military studies overall, 
the account of battles and campaigns appears to be more tractable than others. Thus, to 
illustrate his ideal-type of “instrumental rationality”, Weber (1922a, p. 10; Eng. ed. p. 21) 
mentions  the  Prussian  Moltke  and  the  Austrian  Benedek  fighting  each  other  at  the 
Sadowa battle. Even more clearly, the authors of campaign narratives, beginning with 
Jomini and Clausewitz in the 19
th Century, have given flesh to the view that their field 
has a special susceptibility to rational choice explanation. 
 
                                                 
2 Unless this serves to argue that rational choice theories are absolutely flawed or irrelevant. See the final 
comment by Bates and al. in their reply to Elster: “His real opponent is rational choice theory” (2000, p. 
702).   4 
This  recognized  exemplary  character  of  military  studies,  and  above  all,  campaign 
narratives  should  be  of  interest  to  the  “analytic  narrative”  writers  and  their  fellow-
travelers. From this point of departure, they could hope to pass more easily through the 
strictures set by the first level of objections, and thus to establish a genuine dialog with 
professional historians, who seem a little more disposed here than elsewhere to relax their 
longstanding mistrust of rational choice theories. In this group, game theory enjoys a 
place of natural support since its technical concepts – beginning with that of the strategy 
–  have  intuitive  relationships  with  the  military  use.  Admittedly,  von  Neumann  and 
Morgenstern  (1944)  did  not  pay  much  attention  to  military  affairs,  giving  greater 
importance  to  parlor  games  in  their  examples.  But  their  followers  at  the  RAND 
Corporation and in US military institutions dealt with nuclear strategy and deterrence at 
considerable length, and even more relevant to our project, one author in this group, 
Haywood  (1950,  1954),  undertook  a  game-theoretic  analysis  of  some  battles  of  the 




Military applications pay for their didactic facility with a clear disadvantage. Though 
they may succeed in their ambitions, they have not the same demonstrative consequences 
as if they had taken on more resistant subjects such as medieval Genoa or the finances of 
prerevolutionary France. So be it with the present work. Its aim is really to restart the 
debate on “analytic narratives” from a middle ground that can be accepted by the less 
passionate critics. We would be entirely satisfied if we made consensual a bare existential 
point:  there  is  a  class  of  plausible  historical  applications  for  game  theory.  The 
controversy has been so fierce that even such a weak claim was not taken for granted 
among the participants. 
 
What can be claimed for game theory can also be for the theory of individual decision-
making under risk and uncertainty, or decision theory in the narrow technical sense. For 
the latter is usually construed as a special case of the former, and it is anyhow a logical 
prerequisite for it. Despite these clear connections, military applications with just one 
                                                 
3 Brams (1975) breathes new life into the distant work of Heywood; see also O’Neill (1994).   5 
agent facing nature are worth exhibiting; we provide one elsewhere by borrowing again 
from the Waterloo campaign.
4 In contrast, it is an open and very intriguing question 
whether some use in history may ever be found for the aggregative theories of social 
choice. At any rate, we stop at the classic trio of microeconomics texts. What we are not 
addressing are the “rational choice theories” in the informal sense often favored by social 
sciences other than economics. The case for rational choice explanation in history has 
already been made vis-à-vis such informal conceptions with rather plausible examples 
and arguments, and there would be no point in restating it.
5 By the same token, the only 
models of interest will be those applying one of the theories above to particular histories 
– hence they will be mathematical, not informal models. In thus constricting our subject 
matter, we highlight the most spectacular conflict of all, i.e., that between a liberal (in 
several  senses)  discipline  and  a  set  of  tools  so  coarse  and  uncouth  as  to  be  perhaps 
beyond  assimilation.  Seemingly  an  oxymoron,  the  slogan  of  the  “analytic  narrative” 
underlines this tension well. 
  
Among  the  topics  available  in  military  history,  ours  is  scarcely  original,  but  this  is 
perhaps more of an asset rather than a liability, given the previous guidelines. An old 
chestnut from the strategy courses of staff colleges in the 19
th Century and early 20
th 
Century,  Napoleon’s  1815  campaign  has  remained  an  inexhaustible  and  fascinating 
subject for war historians up to the 21
st century. The rich bibliography in three major 
languages is an attraction of the case. An even more important reason for selecting it is 
that,  despite  so  much  available  evidence,  historians  have  been  unable  to  come  to 
agreement on how to explain Napoleon’s stupendous disaster, and what they disagree 
precisely on is the rationality of this prominent actor. The game-theoretic modeling may 
renew the time-honored controversies, and if it does, the resulting “analytic narrative” 
may be welcome by even some of the critics.   
 
                                                 
4 Mongin (2009) suggests reconstructing several passages in Clausewitz’s account of the campaign in terms 
of individual expected utility maximization. The full game-theoretic perspective is unnecessary to account 
for the agents’ decisions in these passages. 
5 See in particular Hempel’s (1965, ch. 9 and 12) classic discussion.   6 
The  controversies  go  back  to  an  account  the  overthrown  emperor  dictated  at  Sainte-
Hélène  to  his  companions  in  exile,  which  was  a  plea  pro  domo.  Among  the  texts 
recording it, we have selected Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène by Las Cases because it is the 
most widely distributed and the most succinct.
6 Napoleon's line is to lay the blame for 
defeat  with  marshals  Grouchy  and  Ney,  who  he  claims  misjudged  their  strategic 
possibilities and did not properly follow his instructions. However, Clausewitz, who had 
access to Memorial as well as further French and German sources, reached the opposite 
conclusion that the underlings might be pardoned and the hero should not be exculpated. 
The first genuine scholar of the campaign, the Prussian general is also a passionate critic 
of Napoleon’s handling of it. With various nuances, his position has carried the day in the 
literature, but the imperial argument, long upheld by French military writers, has not 
disappeared altogether. One meets it still today, with qualifications that leave it no less 
worth considering than the other. So historians are in a deadlock, and after so much time, 
there seems to be little hope that progress will be made by traditional means; this is our 
best justification for trying the “analytical narrative” perspective.   
 
Clausewitz’s interpretation is to be found in a monograph, The Campaign of 1815 in 
France, which the treatise On War has regrettably overshadowed, and it is a secondary 
aim of this paper to draw attention to that part of his work.
7 In it, one can find anticipated 
use,  if  not  yet  the  full  realization,  of  Weber’s  principle  of  instrumental  rationality 
(henceforth, we simply say “the principle of rationality”). By contrast, the concepts of 
ends and means that direct the classic definitions of war in the treatise spring from an 
abstract  teleology,  detached  from  acting  individuals,  which  is  not  the  same  as  that 
clarified in Weber's methodology. Another contribution of the monograph is that, while 
following the principle of rationality throughout, it now and then surpasses the level of 
                                                 
6 Las Cases includes “Relation de la campagne de Waterloo, dictée par Napoléon” in Mémorial de Sainte-
Hélène under the date of 26 August 1816. The other references are Gourgaud’s La campagne de 1815 and 
Bertrand’s Cahiers de Sainte-Hélène. The last work was published long after its author’s death and played 
no  role  in  the  Waterloo  controversy,  contrary  to  the  first  two,  which  came  out  in  1823  and  1818 
respectively. 
7 Der Feldzug von 1815 in Frankreich. Posthumous like the others, this work appeared in 1835 in the 
Hinterlassene Werke edited by Marie von Clausewitz; it was written in 1827. Clausewitz’s commentators 
have not spent much time on his campaign narratives. For instance, Aron (1976) hardly mentions them at 
all and Paret (1992, ch.9) is somewhat quick and derogatory with them.    7 
generality at which historians normally stop, suggesting – even sketching out – models in 
the sense relevant here. These anticipations are all the more intriguing since, contrary to 
On War, The Campaign is a historical work; it alternates between traditional narrative 
and logical argument that opens the way to contemporary formalization. We will actually 
rebut Clausewitz’s substantial interpretation of Waterloo, but praise his general method, 
and the “analytic narrative” school may be pleased to register him as a glorious precursor.  
 
Section  2  of  this  paper  reviews  the  main  facts  and  interpretations  of  the  campaign, 
emphasizing those which matter for the model to come. It will go light on the tactical 
aspects of the battles, even the major ones of Ligny and Waterloo, and focus on the 
overall  strategy  as  Napoleon  might  have  conceived  of  it.  This  passage  intentionally 
reproduces the standard narrative mode of military historians.  
 
Section 3 changes tone, proposing a model for Napoleon’s all-crucial decision, June 17, 
1815, the day after his victory over Blücher at Ligny. That day he chose to send more 
than  a  third  of  his  forces,  under  the  command  of  Grouchy,  against  the  retreating 
Prussians. All the commentators agree that this division of the French army was the key 
to Wellington’s victory, June 18 at Waterloo. Grouchy spent the fateful day at Wavre, 
baited by Blücher’s rear guard, while the  advance guard marched unimpeded to join 
Wellington in the mist of an uncertain battle. The campaign’s greatest question, which 
involves Napoleon’s rationality, is whether he could have made better use of Grouchy’s 
detachment. The model we propose to answer this question takes the form of a simple 
zero-sum game between Napoleon and Blücher. Despite the absence of Grouchy as an 
autonomous player, it adds precision to the competing hypotheses. In the end, we will 
side with the proNapoleonic minority against the Clausewitzian majority. Rational choice 
modeling, which supplies the arguments, will have thus played its customary charitable 
role vis-à-vis the agent.
8  
 
                                                 
9 Davidson (1980) is famous for emphasizing the principle of charity underlying that of rationality. His 
argument is that we cannot understand others except rationally, and this requires that we also understand 
them charitably.    8 
Section 4 subjects the model to the same three levels of criticism brought against the 
“analytic narrative” methodology, and pursues the argument sketched above for applying 
it to existing campaign narratives. Section 5 explores the methodological tension that 
even such cautiously restricted studies cannot avoid. To eventually reconcile the new 
narrative style with the old one, we will defend the idea that they support each other by 
the  complementarity  of  their  faults.  A  standard  historical  narrative  performs  several 
useful functions at once, but as we argue, does not take any of them to their final stage; in 
particular, say what the historians might, its explanatory role remains very imperfect. The 
missing steps can be achieved by models from rational choice theories, which will have 
the opposite weakness of serving too few purposes at a time. Thus, the strategic game 
constructed for June 17 goes somewhat farther in explaining the events of that day than 
the  available  accounts,  but  it  has  the  drawback  of  sacrificing  the  expressive  and 
evaluative  functions  that  these  accounts  also  supply,  and  hence  should  not  aim  at 
replacing them. Clausewitz's alternation between standard narrative and (in his case only 
suggested) technical modeling is the only feasible scheme for an analytical history.  
 
2. The Waterloo Campaign: main facts and interpretations. 
 
In the spring of 1815, a coalition of the European powers was solidifying against France. 
Napoleon needed to annihilate the two armies already mounted – the English and the 
Prussian – as quickly as possible. Against Wellington’s 93,000 Anglo-Dutch soldiers, 
who were preparing to meet Blücher’s 118,000 Prussians in Belgium before invading 
France,  Napoleon  had  only  the  124,000  troops  of  Armée  du  nord;  his  other  forces 
covered  the  Rhin  or  garrisoned  fortresses.  The  only  way  out  was  to  reproduce  his 
masterstroke  from  the  Italian  campaign:  first  defeat  one  army,  then  the  other.  All 
historians recognize this plan, and most of them, including Clausewitz, hold that it was 
the only one conceivable.
9 At first, the execution seemed promising. With his customary 
swiftness, Napoleon entered Charleroi on June 15, forcing the Prussian advance guard to 
pull back northeast of the city. The allies had not yet joined forces, and each group alone 
                                                 
9 La campagne de France en 1815, tr. by Niessel, 1973, p. 37-43. From now on, all page references to 
Clausewitz are to his monograph and this French version, from which we translated the quotations.   9 
left much to be desired. The Anglo-Dutch were deployed widely around Brussels and 
westward, as Wellington wanted at all costs to maintain communications with Ostend in 
that  direction.
10  And  Blücher  was  headquartered  in  Sombreffe,  some  12  kilometers 
northeast of Charleroi, with only three corps; a fourth, commanded by Bülow, kept the 
rear guard and was useless for battle. In taking this forward position Blücher ran the risk 
of confronting Napoleon with insufficient forces. However, his decision becomes clearer 
in the light of the agreement he had reached with Wellington on May 3, to the effect that 
the allies would meet on the Quatre-Bras-Sombreffe line in the case of an offensive by 
Napoleon.  This  strategy  ran  afoul  of  the  classical  precept  of  maximal  preliminary 
grouping, but Blücher could hope that Wellington would play his agreed-on part in the 
fight. 
 
The Prussians had occupied the hamlet of Ligny, which gave its name to the battle that 
they ended up pitching alone there, over the afternoon and the beginning of the evening 
of  June  16.  Less  famous  than  that  of  June  18,  this  battle  actually  determined  the 
succeeding  chain  of  events,  and  it  is  with  regards  to  its  interpretation  that  the  main 
hypotheses square off. The Campaign, to quote but one account, gives more space and 
emphasis to Ligny than it does to Waterloo.  
 
Blücher’s  risky  strategy,  which  Napoleon  immediately  recognized,  offered  him  an 
opportunity  to  carry  out  his  campaign  plan.  He  won  on  June  16  following  the  two 
standard criteria of victory: lose fewer men than the adversary, and conquer the terrain of 
the battlefield. While very real, this victory was not yet decisive. Blücher managed to 
save most of his forces, some 90,000 men, in sufficient order to bring them back to his 
rear guard. So his initial error – leaving Bülow in reserve – would eventually turn to his 
and Wellington's advantage. In the Memorial, Napoleon implies that the three Prussian 
corps engaged at Ligny escaped destruction through Ney's fault.
11 In fact, he had sent the 
marshal away in the north-west direction with the principal objective of holding the road 
                                                 
10 Hofschröer (1998-1999) stresses that Wellington had weakened himself to prepare for an attack from the 
west, which there was little reason to expect. The Duke had already faced the charge in his reaction to 
Clausewitz; see Bassford (1994, p. 42-45, and 2001 for a transcript of Wellington’s comments). 
11 Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène, Garnier reprint, p. 237 (all page references to this edition).   10 
from Charleroi to Brussels, which Wellington would have to use if he came in support of 
Blücher. Ney’s group - about 25,000 men under his direct command - had the option of 
either  attacking  the  Anglo-Dutch,  or  simply  holding  them  back,  while  taking  the 
Prussians from behind. Napoleon mentions both tasks at once, which is much to ask of 
poor Ney, considering both his resources and his actual capacity for initiative. At the field 
of Quatre-Bras, where he met the English forward guard, he carried out the former task 
slowly and awkwardly, not even considering the latter. The corps of Drouet d’Erlon – 
20,000 more men - was to come to Ligny or Quatre-Bras in case of need, but wandered 
piteously from field to field without engaging; many have seen in this a turning point in 
the campaign.  
 
Clausewitz defends Ney by arguing that the successive orders that Soult, the campaign’s 
chief of staff, sent him in the name of the Emperor were incompatible. This analysis, 
which we will not develop here
12, brings out the rationality principle most clearly: “Ney 
absolutely completed his goals – to block the aid of Wellington. Bonaparte did not come 
to  the  idea  of  having  him  cooperate  in  the  battle  of  Ligny  until  later,  after  having 
recognized Blücher’s position…. Only today can we see [what Ney could have done], by 
bringing into our calculations all the fortuitous circumstances that could not be foreseen 
at  the  time”  (Clausewitz,  p.  105).  Weber  would  not  distinguish  any  better  than  that 
between objective rationality, which can be identified from the perspective of an observer 
looking back, and the subjective rationality of individuals, which is the only pertinent 
type for explaining their actions.
13  
 
Starting a movement that would turn out to be decisive, the Prussians did not back up 
along their natural line of communication, which was the Meuse river valley, but farther 
northward, in the general direction of Louvain. They regrouped over the course of June 
17 at Wavre, a town situated on the river Dyle, mid-way between Ligny and Louvain. 
This  location  allowed  them  to  keep  as  many  options  open  as  possible.  From  there, 
Blücher could either organize a definitive retreat by reaching Liège by way of Louvain, 
                                                 
12 More on it in Mongin (2009). 
13 Cf. Weber (1922b, p. 435-439). The distinction between objective and subjective rationality has since 
become established; see, e.g., Popper’s (1967) classic restatement.   11 
or rejoin Wellington, who was a single day’s march away. On the same day, Napoleon 
chose to  separate his right wing, which Grouchy had commanded at Ligny, of some 
30,000 men. With this detachment, the marshal could either set loose a savage chase 
against the Prussian rear, without worry of what became of the rest of that army, or keep 
this army once joined from meeting the Anglo-Dutch, or to carry out the objectives of 
pursuit and blocking to the extent that they were compatible.  
 
What actually occurred is that  Grouchy set off after the Prussians, who intentionally 
slowed one of their corps, led by Thielemann. On June 18, the marshal pitched battle at 
Wavre against just this rear guard. Meanwhile, the advance guard, with Bülow and Pirch, 
marched unobstructed to Waterloo, and it bowled into the French right on the afternoon, 
early enough to help Wellington, who was not in an easy position.
14 Having missed the 
chance the first time because of Wellington, the allies succeeded in concentrating their 
forces the second time thanks to Blücher. It is unlikely that Grouchy would have brought 
the French victory in a battle including Bülow and Pirch, but if he had been there instead 
of the two Prussians, he would have given Napoleon the numerical advantage needed to 
defeat Wellington. The two commanders faced 70,000 men each against one another, and 
equality favored the latter, who had chosen to fight from a strong defensive position, as 
he had done to his advantage so often before. 
 
As  already  indicated,  a  major  problem  of  the  campaign  is  to  decide  what  Napoleon 
intended to achieve with Grouchy’s detachment. It is closely connected with another, 
which is to decide how Napoleon interpreted the battle of Ligny. To what extent did he 
overestimate  the  extent  of  his  victory,  and  misjudge  the  direction  of  their  retreat? 
Clausewitz (p. 107-109 and 146-148) claims that he made mistakes on both counts, and 
this has dominated the literature since. Let us review the evidence available to answer the 
two questions. 
 
                                                 
14 Although Thielemann had finally to surrender Wavre, he had fulfilled his role by holding the enemy for 
half a day. Clausewitz, then a colonel, served as his chief of staff.    12 
Napoleon's initial orders to Grouchy on June 17 were oral, and neither the Memorial nor 
the marshal’s Memoirs are reliable enough to permit reconstructing them.
15 Clausewitz, 
in his chapter XXXVII, claims that Napoleon entrusted Grouchy with a simple mission of 
pursuit. This, together with an error that Napoleon made concerning the direction of the 
Prussian retreat, would cleanse the marshal of all responsibility in the next day’s rout - 
busy in the east, Grouchy could not at the same time lend a hand to Napoleon. The 
conclusion is implacable if one accepts the premises, but Clausewitz has little more than 
hints to establish these, and his supporters to this day have not substantially improved the 
argument.
16  As  it  had  done  with  Ney,  the  Memorial  (p.  245)  charges  Grouchy  with 
responsibility  for  the  defeat,  claiming  that  he  should  have  been  on  the  Waterloo 
battleground. French military writers have often taken this position, while softening it 
with additional reproaches against  Napoleon, and still more against his  chief of staff 
Soult.
17 A good deal of this is transparent apology; however, there are also historians 
without any emotional stake, such as the 20
th Century British general Fuller (1951-1956, 
ch. 18), who concludes that Grouchy ended up in a place he should not have been.
18 None 
in the present group of commentators could accept Clausewitz’ narrow interpretation of 
the orders of June 17. Napoleon by their reading, unsure of whether the Prussians had 
been truly beaten, would have asked Grouchy to protect him from their intrusion into the 
following  battle.  He  would  thus  have  entrusted  Grouchy  with  a  role  of  blocking  or 
interposing at the same time as one of pursuit. This wider interpretation obviates the 
problem  of  what  Napoleon  precisely  thought  of  the  direction  of  the Prussian  retreat. 
There were two possibilities: either the entire Prussian force had moved east, in which 
case the chase would also serve as interposition; or else the enemy was dispersed, with 
some  forces  taking  the  dangerous  way  to  the  west,  in  which  case  Grouchy  should 
prioritize the objective of blocking over that of pursuit. This line has no more solid proof 
than the other; what is known of the 17 June  does not permit a clear winner in the 
historical contest. 
                                                 
15 Compiled by his descendants, Grouchy’s Mémoires discuss these instructions at length, but the effort at 
exculpation is so blatant that it is impossible to take them seriously.   
16 Even the careful study by Hofschröer (1998-1999) is far from making Clausewitz’s case compelling.  
17 Mauduit (1847) eloquently illustrates the beginning of this line of interpretation, the first of many to 
incriminate the weakness of Soult and the staff in general. 
18 Here Fuller joins forces with Houssaye (1905-1906), a classic of the French rehabilitation literature.   13 
 
The first written communication that follows the oral commands of June 17 is a letter 
dictated to Bertrand, received by Grouchy shortly after he set off. Both interpretations 
can find something in it, the first because it sends the marshal towards Gembloux, i.e., to 
the east, and even worse, towards Namur, which distanced him from the Prussians, and 
the second because it directs him to report on Blücher’s maneuvers, and even to warn the 
staff of any possible intention to join Wellington.
19 From Gembloux, where he did not 
arrive before the late evening, Grouchy replied to Napoleon with a revealing dispatch. 
This  shows  that  he  had  at  last  understood  that  Wavre  was  one  of  the  Prussian 
destinations, but not yet that it was the only one. Also, Grouchy brings up the possibility 
of an enemy move towards Wellington, and adds that he would try to prevent it from 
occurring, which lends some support to the view that the conversation of June 17 had 
suggested interposition as a goal.
20 Although the marshal’s letter arrived at 2:00 in the 
morning,  the  staff’s  reply  was  not  sent  before  10:00,  in  which  we  can  see  definite 
evidence of ill-functioning. On behalf of Napoleon, Soult commanded Grouchy to make 
all haste to Wavre, pushing back any Prussians he finds as he approached the principal 
army. “His Majesty desires that you direct your movements to Wavre, in order to come 
closer to us, and to cooperate with our operations”.
21 The minority line uses this sentence 
to argue that Napoleon wanted to have Grouchy participate in the battle of Waterloo (see, 
e.g.,  Fuller,  1951-1956,  ch.  18).  But  Clausewitz  countered  the  charge  in  advance, 
underlining that it was too late to send orders to Grouchy; in fact, the marshal did not 
receive  them  until  the  afternoon,  by  which  time  he  had  been  stuck  at  Wavre  by 
Thielemann, and Pirch had nearly reached Mont-Saint-Jean.  
 
Regardless of what can be made of the last dispatch, somewhat confused and certainly 
too late, the strategy was clear in itself. Upon his arrival at Gembloux, Grouchy had to 
arrange to block the Prussians' move towards Wellington instead of continuing to chase 
them. Fuller proposes an itinerary consisting of a march to Wavre from the west; thus, the 
                                                 
19  Cited  by  Mauduit  (1847-2006,  p.  142)  and  subsequent  authors,  Bertrand’s  letter  is  missing  from 
Clausewitz, which weakens his chapter XXXVII. 
20 We use the Mauduit’s (1847-2006, p. 160-161) version of this letter. Fuller (p. 285-286) summarizes it 
accordingly, while Grouchy’s Mémoires (LV, p. 58-59) distance themselves significantly from the text.  
21 The letter from Soult appears in Clausewitz (p. 141), as do all the subsequent dispatches.   14 
marshal might intercept the first corps heading to Waterloo. Clausewitz (p. 143) also 
thinks  that  the  westward  march  was  the  best  strategy,  agreeing  for  once  with  the 
Memorial (p. 238-240), which first said that very thing.
22 It therefore appears that on the 
limited level of objective rationality, all the interpreters are in agreement. What divides 
them is how to apportion subjective rationality between the actors on the basis of their 
beliefs, and this conclusion is impossible to reach simply from the documents we have 
surveyed.  
 
We  will  discuss  but  briefly  the  final  battle.  June  17,  after  the fights  of  Quatre-Bras, 
Wellington withdrew his troops to within about ten kilometers of Brussels, on the Mont-
Saint-Jean plateau, whose value for defensive combat he had already spotted.
23 Partly 
hidden along the crest, the Anglo-Dutch could pepper their opponents almost at leisure, 
while the attackers were blocked by solid buildings - farms and convents - in the center 
and on both flanks. On June 18, rain delayed the French attack until 11:30, and hindered 
the artillery preparation that Napoleon was accustomed to implement before attacking. 
For this reason and others, the first offensive, directed against the center of the Anglo-
Dutch line, was a complete rout. Several historians, including Fuller, conclude that with 
such a bad start, Napoleon should have given up fighting the moment he heard of the 
arrival of the Prussians, that is near 3:30 p.m.
24 By moving to the defensive, he might 
have saved his army and fled with it back to France. But he did not. He tried to settle the 
outcome with a sequence of thrusts to the enemy’s center, while simultaneously trying to 
close the gaps that the Prussians made in his right wing. The specialists have never seen 
anything but a constant battle plan, but have judged it simplistic, dangerous given the 
frail right flank, and above all of stunningly feeble tactical execution. Leaving aside the 
full  succession  of  attacks,  we  will  single  out  the  last  and  most  famous,  that  is  the 
engagement,  around  7:30,  of  the  Old  Guard,  which  was  the  last  available  reserve. 
                                                 
22 Houssaye (1905-1961, p. 294-295) explains the desirable path. Grouchy would leave Gembloux by the 
west, marching to Mousty and Ottignies, where he would cross the Dyle and follow the river’s left bank. 
23 It would be more accurate to call the battle after Mont-Saint-Jean, where it took place, than after the 
neighboring  village  of  Waterloo,  but  Wellington  wanted  that  name  to  be  chosen.  The  Germans  – 
Clausewitz among them – long preferred to call the battle after the farm of Belle-Alliance, where Blücher 
and Wellington met in the evening of June 18. 
24 Roberts (2005) puts the best moment for withdrawal even earlier.   15 
Followed by many others, Clausewitz believes that it was an absolutely hopeless move. 
He goes as far to claim that Napoleon no longer truly knew what he was doing (p. 158). 
 
The moment has arrived for analytically reconsidering the campaign’s main junctures. At 
three key moments – June 17, around mid-day on June 18, and in the final hours of this 
same  day  –  Napoleon  could  have  departed  from  the  line  of  events  that  his  previous 
decisions had set in motion, and he did not. Is this inertia or lack of reflection, in which 
case he would no longer conform even to subjective rationality? Or is it a failure to 
correctly appreciate the situation at hand, in which case this form of rationality could be 
salvaged?  Or  is  it  the  case  that  Napoleon  assessed  the  situation  correctly  from  the 
perspective  of  objective  rationality,  simply  accepting  the  immense  risks  that  this 
assessment  made  clear?  Essentially,  Clausewitz  interprets  the  engagement  of  the  Old 
Guard as pure and simple irrationality, and the dismembering of the army after Ligny as 
the result from an incorrect belief held in accordance with subjective rationality. He is 
more  cautious  in  handling  Napoleon’s  decision  to  continue  the  battle  despite  the 
threatening Prussian advance. At this point, he realizes that a taste for risk exacerbated by 
the circumstances may be consistent with subjective and even objective rationality - the 
last of the three interpretations we have just sketched out.
25  
 
The diagnosis is complicated by Napoleon’s objectives, which were not of the usual 
military kind. He needed not just to win the campaign, but to win it absolutely; for a 
weak victory would not have saved France from being invaded and his regime from 
collapsing. The two goals that Clausewitz usually assigns to war – destruction of the 
enemy forces and the political advantage that can be taken from the actions, whether 
victorious or not – were firmly bound together
26. The Borodino battle of the Russian 
campaign, as reinterpreted in On War (IV, 12), will make this clear by way of contrast. 
There, Napoleon refused to engage his reserves against Kutuzov, consciously giving up a 
more complete victory that was otherwise within his reach. He was justified in holding 
                                                 
25 See Clausewitz, p. 157. This is a brilliant insight for a time when the concept of risk-attitude was not yet 
separated from those of risk or uncertainty; see Mongin (2009). 
26 The tension between these two goals of war can be seen throughout On War, and Aron’s (1976, ch. III) 
commentary brings it even more clearly to light.    16 
back his limited forces, says Clausewitz, because he meant to enter Moscow in such 
obvious superiority that the tsar would beg peace from him. Borodino illustrates the long-
term political objective separating itself from the short-term military objective, a mental 
situation exactly opposite to that of Waterloo.
27 In 1815, the short term was the long term, 
there was nothing to be gained from restraint, and only by incurring extravagant risks 
could Napoleon hope to reach his objectives. 
 
Even the brutal sacrifice of the Guard is more ambiguous than it first appears. Recent 
military  analysis  permits  reconsidering  the  battle’s  last  phase.  The  partial  fall  of  the 
Anglo-Dutch center around 6:30 afforded Napoleon his best chance of the day. Had he 
launched the Guard at this moment precisely, rather than an hour later, fate, perhaps, 
would have turned in his favor.
28 This purely tactical reasoning should be contrasted with 
an interpretation that has sometimes been put forward. Taking the defeat to be certain, 
Napoleon would have found appropriate to his legend to finish it with some grandiose, 
desperate gesture. This is a wild suggestion, but it is not incompatible with the other, and 
what both have in common is that they deepen the actor's goals in order to dispel the 
impression that he acted irrationally. 
 
The decision to cut the army in two suffers from a difficulty of a spatial and material 
nature that cannot be overcome by reconsidering the ultimate goals. Since the unexpected 
northward movement of the Prussians made it impossible for Grouchy to carry out both 
the blocking and pursuit missions, one can attempt to salvage Napoleon's rationality by 
emphasizing  either  his  misperception  of  the  retreat  (Clausewitz's  solution)  or  his 
prioritizing interposition over pursuit in the orders to Grouchy (Fuller's). As we have 
seen, the conflicting hypotheses are loosely formulated and have no firm evidence to rely 
on. A proper model of the Emperor’s choice should help on both scores. Not only will it 
make each alternative logically more definite, but if it works well, it will discriminate 
between them, thus acting like a substitute for the missing data. 
 
                                                 
27 Herbert-Rothe (2005) also compares the two battles of Waterloo and Borodino.  
28 This idea comes from Roberts (2005, p. 95).   17 
3. A game-theoretic model of the decision of June 17, 1815 
 
In the following, we model only the actions of Napoleon, Grouchy and Blücher, ignoring 
Wellington, which can be defended on the ground that he remained fixed at Mont-Saint-
Jean after bringing his men there on June 17. In a more debatable simplification, we give 
Blücher only two possible actions: 
B1, march north, then go westward to join Wellington. 
B2, march north, then go eastward to return to Germany. 
We  omit  a  third  possibility,  B3,  which  would  consist  of  marching  straight  east  to 
Germany. This brings the analysis closer to the actual choice of the Prussians, who did 
not take B3 into consideration. The omission is more debatable from Napoleon’s point of 
view, since he initially expected B3 to occur. However, it would be awkward to formalize 
the revision of beliefs that took place on June 17 and 18, and we will assume that, even 
on Clausewitz's interpretation, Napoleon is at any time uncertain between B1 and B2, 
instead of reaching this state of mind only after believing in B3. 
 
No less schematically, two states of the world are possible: 
E1, Blücher is badly weakened, 
E2, Blücher is not badly weakened. 
Before  knowing  which  state  is  realized,  Blücher  therefore  has  four  strategies  at  his 
disposal: 
(Bi, Bj) = if E1, then Bi; if E2, then Bj, i, j, = 1, 2. 
(By  definition,  a  strategy  is  a  function  that  associates  actions  to  states  of  the  world 
recognizable by the player.)  
 
On the French side, another gross simplification will integrate Grouchy into Napoleon, 
treating them as though the latter were in fact the sole decider. It is somewhat paradoxical 
that this is less contestable from the marshal’s own view point – his Memoirs describe 
him as a simple executor of orders – than from the point of view of Napoleon and his 
staff officers, who overloaded him with complex instructions. Not only does it classically 
facilitate the game-theoretic analysis to bring the number of players to two, but we will   18 
eschew the difficulty of handling conditional strategies such as the following: chase the 
Prussian rear-guard if it does not appear that the advance-guard is moving to join the 
Anglo-Dutch force, drive westward in the opposite case. Yet the minority position à la 
Fuller would be best formalized by analyzing Grouchy just in terms of such strategies. 
 
Thus fused with Grouchy, the player Napoleon has three possible actions: 
S1, keep the army together, 
S2, detach Grouchy’s forces and send them to block Blücher’s path to Wellington, 
S3, detach Grouchy’s forces and send them in Blücher’s pursuit. 
Now technically reinterpreted, blocking (or interposition) means that the clash between 
Grouchy and Blücher will occur if Blücher goes west (case S2B1) and not if Blücher goes 
east (S2B2), while pursuit means that the clash will occur if Blücher goes the latter way 
(case  S3B2)  and  not  if  he  goes  the  former  (S3B1).  With  these  definitions,  Grouchy’s 
behavior becomes, as intended, mechanical. He rushes where Napoleon commands, and 
engages in battle or not depending on whether or not he meets Blücher there. Whereas 
Blücher learns at the interim stage which state of the world is realized, Napoleon does 
not, and his strategies are therefore constant functions across the states; that is, they are 
identical to his actions S1, S2, S3. 
 
The following probability parameters represent Napoleon’s beliefs: 
  k, the probability that Blücher is badly weakened by his defeat at Ligny; 
  l, the probability of victory for Napoleon’s consolidated army against a united 
Wellington and Blücher, supposing Blücher was not badly weakened (we will 
take l to be 0 in a simplified variation); 
  l′, the probability of victory for Napoleon’s consolidated army against a united 
Wellington and Blücher supposing Blücher was badly weakened; 
  l′′,  the  probability  of  victory  for  Napoleon  without  Grouchy  against  a  united 
Wellington and Blücher, supposing Blücher was badly weakened; 
  m, the probability of victory for Napoleon without Grouchy, and against only 
Wellington, regardless of the state of Blücher’s forces.    19 
It is automatic to suppose that l′ > l and l′, m > l′′. Other, less obvious inequalities will 
have to be added to reach a solution. 
 
The model assigns trivial values to all other relevant probability parameters. Thus, it 
gives a value of 1 to: 
  the probability of victory for Napoleon’s entire army against Wellington alone, 
  the probability of Grouchy’s victory against Blücher, supposing that Blücher was 
badly weakened. 
And it gives a value of 0 to: 
  the  probability  of  victory  for  Napoleon,  without  Grouchy,  against  a  united 
Wellington and Blücher, supposing that Blücher was not badly weakened; 
  the probability of victory for Grouchy against Blücher, supposing that Blücher 
was not badly weakened. 
 
It seems inelegant to have so many 0 and 1; however, experimenting with more general 
assumptions, we have found that they did not appreciably change the conclusions. And 
the  Memorial  -  although  an  obviously  suspect  source  -  does  suggest  taking  extreme 
values here. For example, it claims that Grouchy’s detachment was enough to “topple the 
Prussian  rear-guard  in  whatever  position  it  took”  (p.  239).  By  this  token,  it  is 
comparatively  moderate  to  assign  probability  1  to  Grouchy’s  victory  over  Blücher 
conditional on Blücher being weakened. Still from the Memorial, “if Grouchy had been 
on field and time had permitted the French army to deploy itself for battle”, one after the 
other the Emperor would have undone the Anglo-Dutch and Prussian armies (p. 245). 
Again cautiously, we reserve this probability 1 of victory for the case of Napoleon’s 
entire army fighting Wellington alone.  
 
The  model  also  includes  the  following  utility  values,  which  reflect  Napoleon’s 
evaluations, just as the probability values reflected his beliefs: 
  a1, the utility of victory against Wellington, 
  a2, the utility of victory against Blücher, 
  b1, the utility of defeat against Wellington,   20 
  b2, the utility of defeat against Blücher, 
  c, the utility of no confrontation. 
 
Nothing  substantial  is  added  if  we  assume  that  victories  give  positive,  and  defeats 
negative, utility: 
a1 > 0 > b1, a2 > 0 > b2. 
However, by a more debatable assumption, we will freely sum the numbers thus defined. 
In particular, 
a1 + a2 = the utility of victory against Wellington and Blücher together 
b1 + b2 = the utility of defeat against Wellington and Blücher together 
In other words, Napoleon’s victory against his two opponents at Mont-Saint-Jean would 
have  the  same  value  as  his  beating  Wellington  alone  on  this  field,  accompanied  by 
Grouchy’s beating Blücher’s forces elsewhere; and similarly, mutatis mutandis, for the 
defeats of the French at the hands of both enemies.  
 
We must still evaluate the situation in which Grouchy and Blücher do not meet. This 
receives the value c = 0 in the case (S3B1) where Blücher marches west and Grouchy 
pursues him in vain, and the value θa2 - with θ  a parameter between 0 and 1 - in the case 
(S2B2) where Blücher marches east and Grouchy engages in a futile block. The second 
case  differs  from  the  first  in  that  a  Prussian  retreat  without  combat  represents  an 
additional victory for the French, albeit a much lesser one than would have occurred had 
Blücher been beaten on the field again.  
 
All that remains in order to represent the situation as a normal or strategic form game is 
to  define  Napoleon’s  and  Blücher’s  payoffs  for  the  various  outcomes.  Using  the 
probabilities k, l, l′, l′′, m and the utilities a1, a2, b1, b2, c, θa2, we calculate Napoleon’s 
payoffs by the customary rule of expected utility. Blücher’s payoffs will be supposed to 
be algebraically opposite to Napoleon’s. In technical terms, this is a  zero-sum game, 
which reflects the nature of this – although not every – military campaign.
29 One might 
                                                 
29 Following the previous analysis, at Borodino Napoleon did not aim for Kutuzov’s total annihilation. 
Unless the payoffs are redefined, a zero-sum game would therefore not correctly represent the strategic   21 
however  argue  that  the  game  is  not  classically  zero-sum.  Being  also  a  game  of 
incomplete information, it entails opposite values for expected utilities payoffs, which 
means that an assumption is made on the probabilities as well as the final payoffs.  
 
We now sketch the resolution, leaving the details for the appendix. The argument will 
emphasize three expected utility payoffs, denoted V1, V2, V3 in the game matrix: 
 
  B1B1  B1B2  B2B1  B2B2 
S1  V1       
S2      V2   
S3  V3       
 
The first step is to associate with each of Napoleon’s strategies the minimum payoff it 
can bring, taking account of Blücher’s response; this is the strategy’s security payoff. For 
S1, the minimizing strategy is B2B1 and the security payment is V1; for S2, they are B2B1 
and V2; and for S3, B1B1 and V3. The last two conclusions follow from the automatic 
assumptions, but the first needs optional ones on the utility values as well as l, l′, θ. These 
boil down to an algebraically precise statement that l and l′ are bounded from above.
30   
 
The  second  step  compares  the  strategies  S1,  S2,  S3,  supposing  that  each  brings  in its 
security payoff. The largest of the three numbers - his maxmin - is the greatest amount 
that Napoleon can guarantee himself, regardless of what Blücher does against him. We 
will assume that he plays the strategy associated with this value. The comparison between 
S1 and S2 depends on the inequality V1 < V2, which is equivalent to a joint restriction on k, 
l, m and the utility values. This restriction is pleasantly simplified when l = 0.
31 The 
                                                                                                                                                
interaction of the two adversaries. Haywood (1954) also underlines that not every battle is appropriately 
modeled as a zero-sum game. 
30  B2B1  minimizes  the  payoff  of  S1  iff 
  
a1 + a2   b1   b2
a1 + a2   b1   b2
> l, l'.  As  θ  grows,  the  central  expression 
increases towards 1, thus binding l,l' less and less. This is not a very constraining assumption. 
31 We deriveV1 < V2 from m > k(1 – ld) + ld, putting d = (a1 – b1 + a2 – b2) / (a1 – b1). This is a substantial 
and constraining assumption, which is simplified as m > k when l = 0. To ensure that the right-hand side is 
between 0 and 1, we also impose that ld < 1 - another bound on l - and that m > 0, k < 1.   22 
comparison between S3 and S2 depends on the inequality V3 < V2, which follows from a 
joint restriction on k, m, θ and some utility values.
32 On the basis of these conditions, we 
conclude that V2 is Napoleon's maxmin and that he plays S2. 
 
The third step is to investigate Blücher’s strategies, B1B1, B1B2, B2B1, B2B2, calculating 
security payments for each, and finding the highest of these four numbers, i.e., Blücher’s 
maxmin, as well as the corresponding strategy. Without further parameter restrictions, 
these are V2 and B2B1. Making the same behavioral assumption as for Napoleon, we 
conclude that Blücher plays B2B1. 
 
The  resulting  outcome  (S2,  B2B1)  satisfies  von  Neumann  and  Morgenstern's  solution 
concept for zero-sum, two-person games. This is not a genuinely interactive concept; 
rather, as the previous two paragraphs have illustrated, it applies an individual rationality 
argument  twice  over,  rationality  being  identified  with  prudence  (each  player  protects 
himself against the opponent’s most damaging strategy). However, it is a well known 
result - holding somewhat more generally than for zero-sum, two-person games - that a 
solution so defined is also a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, i.e., a pair of mutually optimal 
responses, and conversely.
33 That is to say, S2 is Napoleon’s best response to Blücher’s 
choice of B2B1, and B2B1 is Blücher’s best response to Napoleon’s choice of S2. We could 
have  found  the  solution  (S2,  B2B1)  just  by  computing  best  responses,  but  this  easier 
method  would  have  been  harder  to  justify  in  terms  of  individual  rationality  strictly 
speaking.  
 
The chief tool of zero-sum, two-player games, the minimax theorem, was not directly 
usable here.
34 We obtained the result that Napoleon’s maxmin payoff is equal to the 
algebraic opposite of Blücher's maxmin payoff for the initial – so-called pure – strategies 
of  the  two  players. The  theorem  would  have  secured  the  equality  only  for  the  more 
                                                 
32 A sufficient condition for V3 < V2 is that m  > k(1-θ)a2 / (1-k)(a1-b1). The right-hand side is less than 1 if 
a1-b1 > a2 and either k < ½ or θ > k. The first assumption is fully justified in the historical context of 17 
June. Either of last two is conjectural and enters a substantial explanation of the case. There are other 
sufficient conditions available. 
33 See Nash (1950) and Luce and Raiffa (1957, appendix 2). 
34 Due to von Neumann (1928), this theorem owes its fame to von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944-1947).   23 
numerous – so-called mixed – strategies, which amount to randomizing between the pure 
strategies by means of some probability distribution; hence the need for an ad hoc proof. 
 
In limiting case l = 0, some of the parametric conditions vanish, while V1 > V2 becomes 
equivalent  to  m  >  k,  which  is  easy  to  interpret:  the  risk  that  Blücher  is  not  badly 
weakened is greater than the risk of losing a duel against Wellington. This assumption is 
the core of our game-theoretic account of Napoleon’s deliberation on 17 June, which 
goes informally as follows. First, he discarded S3 because Grouchy could be put to a 
better use if he adopted S2. This step is not entirely trivial, because S3 is not dominated by 
either S2 or S1.
35 Then came the truly difficult choice, that between S1 and S2, which he 
resolved in favor of S2 after comparing the two risks just said. Had Napoleon really gone 
through these reflections, he would have acted prudently, not as the inveterate gambler of 
legend. He faced the unpleasant possibility that Blücher, having weathered Ligny better 
than  expected,  would  defeat  Grouchy,  but  could  exclude  the  worse  possibility  that 
Blücher would join forces with Wellington against him alone.  
 
A passage of Memorial (p. 239) suggests the relatively high value for m that we need for 
the reasoning: the Emperor’s remaining forces were enough to “topple the Anglo-Dutch 
army” despite a slight numerical disadvantage. Unfortunately, it says nothing to suggest 
that  k  was  small,  except  perhaps  in  the  following,  roundabout  way.  Had  Napoleon 
believed the Prussians more diminished than we submit, he would have turned different 
reproaches  on  Grouchy. In  the  already  cited  passage  of  p.  245,  he  describes  himself 
beating Wellington and Blücher one after the other, and he keeps the final victory over 
the Prussian for himself, leaving it to Grouchy to pin him down for some time, while he 
was finishing the Englishman. Such a chain of events only makes sense if Blücher was 
not already annihilated by his defeat at Ligny.
36 
 
                                                 
35 One strategy is dominated by another if it returns a smaller payoff for all the opponents’ responses, in all 
states of the world. This game does not give dominated strategies to Napoleon, but it does to Blücher; see 
the appendix. 
36 Inconclusive  as they also are, two  already discussed  staff documents suggest  a  low k. On  June 17, 
Bertrand warns Grouchy about Blücher’s remaining possible maneuvers, and Soult’s dispatch of June 18 
confirms that Napoleon was concerned about an offensive return of the Prussians.    24 
While distorting Clausewitz’ thesis to an extent, the model brings out the main reason for 
not accepting it. The thesis maintains that Napoleon dispatched Grouchy for a chase even 
though  the  only  sensible  choice  for  him  was  between  dispatching  Grouchy  for 
interposition  and  keeping  the  army  together.  As  can  be  checked,  the  conditions  for 
getting  the  security  payoffs  associated  with  S1,  S2,  S3  are  mild  or  definitional,  and 
maxmin reasoning excludes S3 from consideration simply on the basis of a definitional 
inequality (V3 > V1 follows from l' > l"). So were a Clausewitzian to reject our parametric 
restrictions, he would in effect support S1 against S2, but not S3 against these strategies. 
Admittedly, Clausewitz implied specific values for some parameters. According to The 
Campaign, Napoleon believed the Prussians to be badly damaged and was confident to be 
able to defeat Wellington without Grouchy. This amounts to taking large values for both 
k and m. One may add the reinforcing assumption that Napoleon highly valued another 
full victory against Blücher, i.e., that a2 is large and θ small. This is the Clausewitzian 
case parametrically expressed, and it does not affect the overall comparison.  
 
What now for the proNapoleonic position? The model allows his proponents to make 
some order of their probability assignments. Fuller, for example, could agree with a low 
value for l, fairly large ones for l' and m, and a weak one for k, and he would likely accept 
a moderate abatement θ. Enriched with such parametric restrictions, the position offers a 
logical coherence that the other, given its own preferred restrictions, lacks dramatically. 
This is not to deny that it involves a difficulty that the other does not. For it leaves 
unexplained the behavior of Grouchy, who, in our simple dichotomy of chase or block, 
undertook the former instead of the latter, for which he should have received more or less 
explicit commands. So the model salvages Napoleon's rationality at the cost of wrecking 
Grouchy's. But the Clausewitzians makes the opposite trade-off, which involves a worse 
failure, given what can be inferred from each actor's past performances.  
 
We stressed earlier that the two interpretations could only hypothesize what Napoleon’s 
commands  to  Grouchy  truly  were.  Because  of  this  empirical  limitation,  we  used  the 
model in no less than three functions, all of which involve the same set of parametric 
restrictions.  First,  the  model  permitted  evaluating  the  strategies  S1,  S2,  S3;  second,  it   25 
established that Napoleon, acting rationally, ordered S2 rather than S3; and third, by the 
same rationality assumption, it explained this alleged fact as well as the observed fact that 
he  did  not  order  S1.  In  standard  methodological  accounts,  the  explanatory  use  of 
rationality  assumptions  succeeds  a  straightforward  observational  stage.  It  is  said,  for 
example, that preference maximization explains the consumers' demand function for a 
product, while this function results from market data or questionnaires. But in our study 
like  in  many  other  historical  works,  what  needs  explaining  is  not  fully  observed. 
Equivocal  reports  (the  testimonies  and  dispatches)  stand  for  the  missing  pieces  of 
information (the oral commands). This is why we used the model also in the function - 
numbered  two  above  -  of  clarifying  the  explanandum.  This  makes  the  explanatory 
process  circular,  in  contradistinction  with  the  consumers'  demand  case,  but  not 
necessarily vicious or inadequate. For there is nothing sinister in a circular reasoning if it 
makes overall sense of a sufficient amount of sufficiently diverse data (and it is important 
in this respect that Napoleon's rejection of S1 can be observed). Still, a reasoning of this 
style is probably better fitted to assess the comparative value of existing accounts and 
arguments than to provide a full-fledged explanation of the facts themselves.  
 
4. Response to objections 
 
It is not hard to foresee that the model above will elicit objections similar to those which 
enlivened the “analytic narrative” controversy. At the most abstract level, game theory 
itself was called into question. It is well known, for instance, that some games have no 
solution in any acceptable sense, while others have too many possible solutions, either 
because  there  are  multiple  competing  equilibrium  concepts,  or  because  the  adopted 
concept - typically the Cournot-Nash equilibrium – allows multiple equilibria to exist.
37 
Our  game-theoretic  analysis  escapes  these  difficulties.  It  uses  the  Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium concept in a case – a two-player, zero-sum game – in which specialists have 
never questioned its appropriateness, because it coincides there with an intuitive concept 
of individual rationality, namely prudence. Moreover, our particular game has no other 
pure strategy equilibrium than the one calculated. But it will no doubt be said that our 
                                                 
37 Elster (2000) recalls these difficulties, which he has often emphasized elsewhere, e.g., in his 1986 paper.   26 
technical  assumptions  are  ad  hoc.  Thus  the  criticism  passes  naturally  from  abstract 
objections to those of the intermediate and lowest plane, which are more challenging 
because  they  are  more  specific.  Game-theoretic  applications  to  history  risk 
impoverishing both real events and the theory they draw upon.  
 
We have anticipated on an objection in this group. Grouchy should count among the 
strategic actors, alongside with Blücher and Napoleon. If this were done, a distinction 
between  strategies  and  actions  would  appear  on  the  French  side,  paralleling  that 
implemented on the Prussian side. Napoleon would have the choice of either remotely 
controlling Grouchy, or of delegating him the power to act according to what he would 
find out on the spot. In a game thus refined, the ex post inadequate pursuit might become 
one of the equilibria instead of being a deviation from the single equilibrium. Although 
these changes are desirable, the model such as it is will have served at least to illustrate 
the method and assess the conflicting interpretations.  
 
Another common query in the same group has to do with the actors' objectives, but it 
does not have much force here. We have already argued for the appropriateness of the 
zero-sum assumption. The further assumption of additive utility seems defensible on the 
very same ground, i.e., that nothing short of a crushing victory in the campaign could 
fulfill the Emperor's objectives. The number and order of the battles mattered little to him 
as  long  as  he  achieved  this  final  result.  However,  we  have  not  taken  the  idea  to its 
extreme, since we added only the final, not the expected utilities, which would have 
altered the conclusions significantly.  
 
There  remain  the  objections  of  the  lowest  level  of  generality,  which  were  the 
embarrassing ones in the previous controversy. It was said against each selected historical 
application that it was too ambitious for game theory’s tools. Because our study was 
aimed specially at avoiding this complaint, a fuller analysis of what is peculiar to military 
campaigns is now in order; we organize it into six mutually supporting arguments. 
   27 
First  of  all,  the  hierarchical  nature  of  military  organization  makes  it  acceptable  to 
concentrate the study on the decisions made by a few key individuals – typically, the 
general-in-command, his chief-of-staff and the principal lieutenants. In actual fact, the 
military organization departs from its official definition in a number of ways, and the 
human material never has the suppleness required to make the leaders’ instructions fully 
effective. As would any model based on rational choice theories, ours integrates these 
“frictions” – to use Clausewitz's famous term (On War, I, VII) – by way of probabilizing 
consequences for the actions of the irreallistically few decision-makers it selects. The 
limit of this method is that it rules out some possibly relevant interactions. Thus, to treat 
the discipline among rank-and-file as a stochastic phenomenon is to forget that it depends 
on a range of activity on the leaders’ part – demonstrations of courage, promises, threats 
and exhortations – which do not normally enter the model’s list of actions. To this, we 
may reply that the neglected interaction is not always significant to the same degree, and 
that the empirical material itself should serve as a touchstone. When an army disbands, 
the modeler must bring forth the relation between the leaders and the troops; when it 
obeys orders, as it did on June 18 before the tragic denouement, he may pass over it.  
 
In the second place, as a campaign proceeds – and even more clearly once a battle is 
engaged  –  each  of  the  general-in-command’s  decisions  is  easy  to  locate  in  time  and 
space, and so are, in principle, the staff members’ and lieutenants’ induced decisions.
38 
The proximate effects of all these changes are movements of such and such part of the 
army  at  a  certain  hour  and  in  a  certain  direction,  which  are,  again  in  principle, 
ascertainable. The military distinction between a strategy and a tactic becomes relevant 
at this juncture. The former organizes the movements of a campaign, which prepare for 
battle or link multiple battles in view of the final victory, while the latter arranges the 
movements of a given battle in order to win it out.
39 This is a means-ends hierarchy, but it 
also  taken  to  express  differences  in  spatio-temporal  locations  -  the  movements  of  a 
campaign  being  more  remote  than  those  of  a  battle  -  and  to  reflect  the  hierarchical 
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there is no completely firm evidence of who exactly ordered the main cavalry charge on June 18, and some 
historians have questioned the received view that Ney did. 
39 This is essentially the distinction made by Clausewitz (On War, I, II).   28 
organization  -  the  general-in-command  being  the  sole  responsible  for  the  strategy, 
whereas he shares or delegates responsibilities on the tactic.
40 The June 1815 sequence of 
events illustrates this multiple distinction neatly. On the basis of his plan of campaign, 
Napoleon entrusted Ney and Grouchy with the supervision of battles that were likely to 
be  pitched  in  remote  directions.  Even  on  the  battlefield  of  Waterloo,  where  he  was 
present, he left much to Ney to decide. For the purpose of an “analytic narrative”, it is 
very convenient to be able to investigate  strategic decisions independently of tactical 
ones, especially if this division coincides with one in terms of individual actors. 
 
Third, the overall goal is determined from without and once and for all; it is to win out 
the  battle  or  the  campaign,  as  the  case  may  be.  According  to  the  older  military 
definitions, the first occurs with the final occupation of the field, and the second with the 
conquest of a province or stronghold. The modern concept of a victorious campaign or 
battle is more abstract, holding it to be the destruction of the opposing forces or, failing 
that, their significant weakening, with their own admission of the fact if possible. This 
much is suggested by On War, although there has been some debate on Clausewitz's 
precise meaning.
41 The plural understanding of victory gives birth to some ambiguity in 
the assessment of success or failure as one goes back in time.
42 But this is by and large a 
second-order problem, which should be set against the broadly correct point that, in the 
present context, the teleological component of reasons is both fixed and simple.  
 
Fourth, even a campaign decision of the highest degree of complexity is in principle 
assessed in terms of its final consequences on the field. An idealized general-in-command 
would reduce the content of his decisions to that of their successive effects, then pass 
back step by step from the evaluations of the latter to the comparative evaluation of the 
former. Seen from this consequentialist perspective, the choice of June 17 was relevant 
                                                 
40 Before Clausewitz, Bülow emphasized the spatio-temporal and organizational aspects, i.e., the tactic has 
to do with military movements within the angle of vision or the possible reach of the general-in-command, 
and the strategy with what goes beyond. 
41 Arguing from the relationship of politics to military activity in On War (VIII), Aron (1976) concludes 
that Clausewitz promoted a novel conception of victory. But Paret (1992, p. 106) makes it clear that he did 
not altogether give up the notion that the military objective is to conquer terrain. 
42 Even some Napoleonic events are not easy to classify. With Borodino, Eylau is the classic example of a 
dubious victory, and Tolstoi’s War and Peace goes as far as to claim the two battles for the Russian camp.    29 
only in relation to the chances of victory or defeat which it established for June 18. A 
decision of that kind does exhibit further characteristics - for example it may or may not 
comply with the art of war, or it may require more or less courage than another. But, for 
consequentialism, these characteristics disappear from the evaluation insofar as they do 
not influence the outcome of the engagements (violation of the rules of war may catch the 
enemy off-guard; courage of the commander may fire up the troops). Rational choice 
theories endorse consequentialism mathematically, using combination rules like expected 
utility in order to evaluate actions by backward reasoning,
43 and that military campaigns 
by  and  large  comply  with  this  principle  turns  them  into  a  promised  land  for  the 
application of these theories. 
 
But are the last three characteristics, which so conveniently excuse the simplicity of our 
work, not themselves simplifications of a military activity that is more varied than has 
been admitted? A historical prudence is necessary, given the changes undergone by the 
military activity and its reflection in strategic theorizing since Napoleon’s time.
44 The 
concepts of the decisive battle and of the masterminded campaign that leads to it are 
marked with the stamp of an era. The indefinite battles of the First World War following 
that of the Marne, with the new concept of the total war they heralded, the colonial wars, 
the guerrilla combats and other dirty wars so common in the 20
th Century - all shook the 
previous  characteristics  to  a  significant  extent.  In  the  other  direction,  scholars  have 
pointed out that the wars of Ancien Regime embodied highly specific conceptions of the 
battle and the campaign, and even of the destructive nature of war. Taking these facts into 
account, strategic thinking today is more inclined to emphasize historical variability than 
it was at its Clausewitzian peak. Since our “analytical narrative” methodology aims at 
connecting the proposed models with existing accounts, we cannot ignore the intellectual 
shift. Thus, our game-theoretic application is open to the objection that it is too well 
chosen, revealing only limited potential for generalization beyond its time period. The 
same techniques as we used on Napoleon might still analyze Joffre at the Marne, but only 
                                                 
43 Game theory which employs rules other than expected utility is regrettably not well developed. 
44  On  these  changes,  see  the  Earle's  collection  (1943)  and  Aron’s  (1976)  comments  on  Clausewitz’s 
heritage.   30 
with difficulty Falkenhayn at Verdun, and probably not at all Massu during the battle of 
Algiers, or the Israeli generals during their South Lebanon campaigns. 
 
While we must emphasize relativity in some way, we are not committed to the historical 
relativism  that  the  previous  argument  suggests.  Military  campaigns  confront  rational 
choice theories with a continuum of obstacles that exist in the abstract before taking 
shape at particular time locations. That is to say, these theories apply more closely as the 
distinction becomes clearer between war and peace, and combat and cessation; as the 
goals of the combatants in each camp turn out to be more closely aligned; as military 
decision-making adheres to a stricter hierarchy; and similarly with other properties. By 
exploring this kind of dependency further, we would eventually conclude that it is not 
history  per  se  that  decides  whether  or  not  an  application  is  feasible.  Indeed,  casual 
reviews suggest promising examples in the mid-20
th Century or in Ancien Regime or 
even  in  Ancient  Rome,  as  well  as  discouraging  ones  at  the  height  of  19
th  Century 
strategism.
45 A military historian adopting the methodology proposed here would not be 
in a very different position from an economist, whose success varies with the areas of 
social interaction to which he applies the maximizing and equilibrium assumptions of his 
theories. 
 
A fifth significant consideration is that military actions are already seen as rational or 
irrational even before the observer applies these qualifiers. The actors themselves are 
usually the first to adopt them, either ex ante or ex post; then, polarized in the same way, 
come  the  judgments  of  witnesses,  memoirs  writers,  military  instructors,  academic 
historians.  It  is  out  of  the  question  to  set  aside  any  of  these  layers  of  commentary, 
because taken together, they make up almost all of the information history can collect, 
and also because they direct towards the topics in need of treatment. Napoleon produced 
the first systematic study of the Waterloo campaign, which made possible Clausewitz’s 
and moved others, and on it went, right up to the current modest essay, which capitalizes 
much  on  its  predecessors.  Each  step  has  brought  out  both  new  information  and  new 
                                                 
45 Compare the campaigns investigated by Fuller (1954-56) on a very broad time range. Some are evidently 
more amenable to rational choice modeling, but there is no such obvious time-dependency as it seemed at 
first glance.   31 
problems, sometimes unsuspected.
46 The existence of a reflective spiral is certainly not 
specific to military history among the various historical sub-disciplines, but its nature is; 
for more or less openly, all commentaries in this branch boil down to questioning the 
rationality of the main actors. 
 
We close the list with a sixth and final point, whose weight will depend on the more or 
less conclusive instantiation of the third. Schematizing the teleological side of the reasons 
for  action  helps  to  underscore  the  explanatory  power  of  the  cognitive  side.  Rational 
choice  theories  –  more  generally  speaking  than  just  game  theory  –  find  their  peak 
inferential capacity when they are specialized in this way.
47 For example, by assuming 
that  firms  maximize  their  profits,  economists  manage  to  connect  the  oligopolistic 
structure of a market with the conjectures that each firm makes about its competitors' 
strategic moves. Or again, by assuming that stock market traders maximize their expected 
utility, and that they are identically risk-averse, they can relate asset prices to the beliefs 
held by these traders. Both applications illustrate the logical power of models that, for 
one, postulate simple objectives, and for another, keep them fixed throughout. Military 
historians approximate this one-sided method when, proceeding from the assumption that 
victory  is  desirable,  they  focus  their  explanations  on  a  few  actors’  beliefs  and  risk-
attitudes. Military historians may be even more justified than economists in going this 
way, because their assumption that the general-in-command aims at victory is altogether 
more convincing than the peculiar teleological assumptions just mentioned on firms and 
traders. 
 
Returning  to  the  “analytic  narrative”  controversy,  we  see  that  the  six-character  list 
illustrates a possible handling of the objections of the lowest level. Instead of arguing 
about  the  studies  on  their  individual  merits,  it  would  help  if  one  related  them  to  a 
preexisting list of conditions of applicability, and check the extent to which each study 
satisfies these conditions. Thus viewed, even that part of the controversy might find a 
                                                 
46 Largeaud (2008) provides a thorough account of how interpretations of Waterloo have succeeded, and to 
an extent generated, each other on the French scene.  One would welcome similar reviews for the British 
and German scenes. 
47 One can debate the explanatory dissymmetry that appears between desires and beliefs. Davidson (2004, 
p. 26) claims that it is structural, but others see only an accidental property of the available facts.    32 
more balanced resolution than it did. No doubt, the characters selected above are fitted 
for the military application and not yet at the proper level of generality, but they do 
suggest directions in which more abstract criteria may eventually be found. 
 
5. How to articulate rational choice modeling with historical narrative 
 
Among other obstacles when they enter the study of history, rational choice theories 
confronts  “the  culture  of  the  unique”,  to  quote  a  recent  discussant's  felicitous 
expression.
48 This refers to a common tendency in the field to treat past events from the 
angle  that maximizes  their individuality.  On  the  philosophical view  that  the historian 
seeks not just to evoke, reconstruct or describe that which has passed, but also to explain 
it, he shows a distinctive taste for singularity in the choice of both explanandum and 
explanans. A reproducible natural phenomenon such as the eruption of Vesuvius in 79 
C.E. interests him only to the extent that it serves to establish surrounding events that are 
unique in character. The historian may ask, for instance, why Pompeii and its neighboring 
countryside developed so well under the threat of a destructive eruption. Although it 
would be conceivable to connect the farmers and merchants of Pompeii with those who, 
in another age, fell beneath the eruptions of Etna or the Java volcanoes, it is doubtful that 
the historian of ancient Rome would accept so to extend his explanandum. For this would 
again mean highlighting similarities, even if the regularity is now social and not geological 
in nature. The same  predilection can be found in the tentative explanans. Rather than 
reduce  the  attitude  in  Pompeii  to  extemporal  schemata  of  risk  calculation,  historians 
prefer invoking, say, the judicial system of Campanian agriculture in the first Century, or 
the complex subjective relationships that the pagans of antiquity had with natural forces. 
Although perhaps too didactic, this little example shows how the “culture of the unique” 
may permeate the whole of historical work, and if it does involve such an activity, the 
whole of historical explanation. Rational choice theories are excluded twice over - by the 
nature of the questions posed and that of the answers provided.  
                                                 
48 Grenier (2001, p. 91).   33 
 
But  does  not  the  taste  for  singularity  run  up  against  the  obvious  fact  that  history 
sometimes repeats itself? This objection calls for a straightforwardly semantic response; 
it  is  undone  through  a  reinterpretative  analysis  that  is  in  principle  applicable  to  any 
possible case. By adducing the fact of repetition to those characteristics of the events 
whereby repetition occurs, one paradoxically reinstates the uniqueness of the events in 
question. If Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte’s coup of 18 Brumaire is viewed as an purposeful 
reproduction of his uncle’s 18 Brumaire, then, as Marx ironically underlines, the two acts 
differ for exactly that reason, the one being a parody of the other. A more abstract, but 
still comparable, semantic analysis would take account of nonintentional repetition. To 
take a scholastic example, if John Lackland passed twice by the same place, this return 
could  well  have  been  involuntary  and  even  unknown  to  the  principal,  yet  it  holds  a 
distinguishing connotation - the sad and rare destiny of a prince bereft of his dominion. It 
is enough for the historian to emphasize this secondary meaning for John’s return to 
cease to seem as such; it has become a novel kind of event. Thus, it is always possible to 
embrace repetition from the point of view of historical singularity, and although this is 
but an option, not a necessity, historians generally follow it.
49 
 
The above insights on the “culture of unique” do not appear to clash with the view that it 
is an acquired disposition among historians – therefore a “culture” in the literal sense – 
rather than a structural constraint imposed by their discipline. Abstractly, the general can 
be contrasted with the particular as well as with the singular, and these are two different 
concepts. The singular is unique and inimitable, while the particular does not have to be 
so. Dupont, a French citizen, is listed under a certain number in the national registry upon 
his birth; this number is particular to him, but in no way does it singularize him, since 
every other French citizen also receives an equally particular number. Guided by this 
contrast,  we  raise  the  question,  why  must  the  historian  favor  the  singular  over  the 
particular? Why must he refrain from considering the choice of location of the Pompeians 
from  the  perspective  of  a  commonplace  calculation  of  risks  and  benefits  that  also 
encompasses the peasants of Java and Sicily? The “culture of the unique” could simply 
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be a historiographic trend among others, related to the peculiar belief that anachronism is 
the  gravest  of  professional  errors.  Since  it  may  result  in  relativism,  which  not  all 
historians accept, it is easy to conceive of an opposite trend that reverses the priority of 
evils, holding this consequence to be even worse than anachronism. To document the 
conflict between the two trends in historiographic research goes beyond this work, but 
perhaps enough has been said to conclude that  the “culture of the unique” is not an 
objection; it would be one if it were more than a culture, which is precisely dubious.  
 
We would end up with a stronger dismissal if we rallied Hempel’s (1965) classic analysis 
of historical explanation. According to this analysis, a statement on the Pompeian judicial 
or religious system cannot explain why the inhabitants lived under the threat of Vesuvius 
if  it  is  not  made  part  of  a  larger  formulation  that  includes  general  laws  -  and  most 
typically, although Hempel was not dogmatic here, a rational choice theory. Then, the 
institutional facts just mentioned become “initial conditions” of the laws, or if the latter 
do belong to a rational choice theory, parameters describing the inhabitants’ objectives 
and  beliefs.  It  follows  from  Hempel’s  analysis  that  historians  should  either  give  up 
explanation as one of the discipline’s tasks or overcome “the culture of the unique”, 
which  diverts  their  attention  from  generalities.  Hempel  himself  took  the  view  that 
historians do make, or at least  sketch, explanations, and that they overemphasize the 
singularity  of  events  only  by  a  misperception  of  this  process.  Because  they  are  not 
interested  in  generalities  per  se,  they  impoverish  their  picture  of  their  own  work, 
retaining only the “initial conditions” or the parameters of each historical situation. An 
alternative view is that they know exactly what they are doing, and indulge in other 
activities than explanation: for example, description, evocation, or comprehension, genres 
which  Hempel  carefully  separates  from  explanation.  By  not  practicing  it,  historians 
would diminish the scientific status of their discipline; this time, more than their self-
image is at issue. Each Hempelian line delivers a direct argument against “the culture of 
the unique”. But the initial analysis of explanation has been contested so often that we   35 
cannot simply embark on it here.
50 We will be content with the less sweeping dialectical 
reply made above. 
 
The worst obstacle impeding rational choice theories is yet to come. Models, which are 
their vectors for concrete application, do not get on well with narratives, the historians’ 
canonical  way  of  expression.  This  contrast  has  risen  to  the  forefront  of  some  recent 
methodological  discussions.
51  What  makes  it  serious  is  that  the  narrative  genre  is 
immensely flexible, hence apparently self-sufficient; to superimpose a modeling exercise 
seems to be not only cumbersome, but unnecessary. In order to evaluate the objection, let 
us  briefly  review  the  roles  that  narratives  play  outside  the  literary  field  of  fiction. 
Certainly, they can evoke, describe, and help understand the events they report. It is an 
open question - actually connected with the Hempelian debate - to what extent they also 
perform explanations. A feature that has not yet been mentioned is that narrators pass 
judgments that are not always exclusively factual. Some are evaluative and some – more 
subtly – factual and evaluative at once; both this duality and its partial erasure are rooted 
in ordinary language, which is the narrator’s medium.
52 We also insist, because it is so 
rarely  mentioned,  on  the  feature  that  narratives  allow  one  to  discuss  human  actions 
without deciding – or even addressing – the metaphysical question of determinism and 
liberty. “On June 18, the ground remained sodden until late morning, and the battle did 
not begin until that time.” Such a sentence is, as it were, metaphysically open. At a closer 
examination, it may be either that the weather conditions made an early start unfeasible 
or  that  Napoleon  preferred  to  wait,  having  a  real  choice.  The  narrator  can  carry  on 
without  committing  himself  to  either  view;  his  sentence  is  entirely  comprehensible, 
although not very explanatory as it stands. 
 
We are now to discuss two major causes of tension between models and narratives. The 
former  are  associated  with  hypothetico-deductive  reasoning,  which  the  latter  cannot 
accommodate.  Along  with  their  special  symbolism,  the  former  carry  with  them  a 
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51 Le modèle et le récit (2001) extends this duality to the social sciences generally. 
52 Such  commonplace predicates  as progress or poverty  are, by nature and  irreducibly, hybrids of  the 
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semantic of their own that is inassimilable by the latter. It is worth stressing that conflicts 
occur despite the fact that the narratives of interest are nonfictional; we may assume that 
the same concern with truth is shared by the modeler and narrator.
53 
 
We must immediately qualify the first cause of tension. Obviously, a narrative is not a 
deduction, but because it deals with human action, it includes an inferential aspect of an 
everyday sort. “Having considered the sodden ground, Napoleon delayed the start of the 
battle.” The temporal succession here covers an inference by the actor and, doubtless, by 
the narrator himself - nobody would send people and carts out if the mud would impede 
their progress. It is another virtue of the narrative that it need not make precise to what 
extent  chronological  order  establishes  logical  order  and,  if  it  does,  upon  whom  such 
logical order depends, the actor or the author. Beside inferences, narratives can leave 
room for hypotheses - the other ingredient of hypothetico-deductive reasoning. It would 
be  a  mistake  to  believe  that  nonfictional  narratives  rule  them  out  because  of  the 
declarative nature of their statements. For these statement may be true or false even if 
there is no sure way to determine which in fact it is, and the narrator can in this case 
either  confer  on  them  an  intermediate  value,  such  as  probable,  or  suspend  judgment 
altogether. “Napoleon probably decided that the mud did not permit an attack.” “One 
might ask whether the  attack took place after 11:30 because of the earlier inclement 
weather, or for other reasons.” Sentences like these are optional, because a narrator is 
under no obligation to make his epistemic states public, but they fall easily into place. 
They  bring  out  hypothetical,  even  hypothetico-deductive,  nuances  that  are  acceptable 
within the limits of the genre.  
 
The second cause of tension - the semantic duality - appears thornier. A rational choice 
model brings with it not only mathematical notions, but a customary interpretation of 
them,  on  which  the  effective  work  of  this  model  is  conditioned.  In  game  theory,  to 
mention  but  this  major  case,  the  various  notions  of  equilibria  are  associated  with 
scenarios that modelers use for reasoning at the same time as they write the algebra – and 
often in place of the algebra altogether. The problem is that these semantics differ from 
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those of the historian. They have been elaborated within game theory’s own cultural 
tradition. They combine vague generalities of common sense claimed unreservedly (e.g., 
that  people  prefer  more  to  less),  assumptions  presented  as  convenient  simplifications 
(e.g., numerical payoffs used to capture satisfaction), analogies elevated to schemes of 
reasoning  (e.g.,  lotteries  serving  to  describe  all  sorts  of  probabilistically  uncertain 
outcomes). The historian may well be suspicious of such specialized meanings, which are 
likely not to match well with his own. A strategy, in the parlance of military historians, 
does  not  mean  the  same  as  for  game  theorists;  a  commonplace  for  the  former,  the 
distinction between a strategy and a tactic is unfamiliar to the latter. It would be easy to 
flesh out the list of mismatches between the two groups of researchers.  
 
But this very real difficulty does not dash any hope of reconciling historical narratives 
and rational choice models. The last paragraph actually set a concretely identified rational 
choice theorist against an also concretely identified historian. The tension arises between 
two heterogeneous micro-cultures that are not forever fixed and may even coevolve with 
contact. Thus, the notions of tactic and strategy are not impossible to represent game-
theoretically, and conversely, historians might absorb the technical distinction between 
strategies and actions. In fact, the semantics of the two groups both sink their roots into 
common sense, which needs only to be systematized, and certain natural connections will 
appear. Some existing campaign narratives exhibit these connections so well that it does 
not require too much extra-work to proceed to the modeling stage. We have illustrated 
this process when basing our game theory on Clausewitz's and Fuller's accounts. For sure, 
the process involved a semantic loss, but it appears neither that it destroyed all meaning, 
nor  that  it  reassembled  diverse  meanings  incoherently.  In  sum,  the  objection  of 
incompatible semantics does not have the weight that was first afforded to it.  
 
A generality now begins to make itself seen. The tension between historical narrative and 
rational choice modeling is relaxed as soon as we give up the attempt to put them on 
equal footing – as though the first were a well defined genre, after the fashion of the 
other. The historical narrative never discharges its functions entirely; only for that reason 
can he serve so many of them at a time. It is flexible all right, but not self-sufficient. At   38 
the opposite, rational choice modeling lends its hand to a few functions thoroughly; it 
untangles ambiguity – that is its gain – but is too focused – that is its loss. Thus, when 
applied to a narrated sequence of events, it makes explicit the underlying inferences, 
assigning them to the actor, the narrator or both; it unearths epistemic values that the 
narrator had merely meant to suggest; it unifies to an extent the semantic values, favoring 
those with commonsense interpretations. Taking up other features of the narrative for 
comparison,  we  may  add  that  rational  choice  modeling  promotes  explanation  at  the 
expense of evocation and description, stabilizes the distinction between the factual and 
the evaluative, and also clarifies that between determinism and liberty. On each score, the 
precision  gained  has  a  possible  cost  of  irrelevance  or  even  silliness.  The  modeler  is 
chancy where the narrator was overcautious. The two would better work side by side, 
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APPENDIX 
 
As stated in the text, the zero-sum game between Napoleon and Blücher has a unique 
equilibrium  (S2,B2B1)  if  some  optional  conditions  hold,  beyond  those  which  are 
automatically ensured by the definitions of final payoffs, probabilities and the abatement 
coefficient  θ.  The  present  appendix  gives  some  details  on  the  computation  of  this 
equilibrium. 
 
Let us label Napoleon's payoffs in the following way: 
 
  
B1B1 B1B2 B2B1 B2B2
S1 V11 V12 V13 V14
S2 V21 V22 V23 V24
S3 V31 V32 V33 V34
 
 
Each Vij is obtained by an expected utility calculation: 
 
[ ] [ ] ) )( 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) )( ' 1 ( ) ( ' 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 11 b b l a a l k b b l a a l k V +   + +   + +   + + =  
  
V12 = k l'(a1 + a2)+ (1  l')(b1 + b2) [ ]+ (1  k) a1 + a2) [ ] 
  
V13 = k(a1 + a2)+ (1  k) l(a1 + a2)+ (1  l)(b1 + b2) [ ] 
  
V14 = a1 + a2 
  
V21 = k ma1 + (1  m)b1 + a2 [ ]+ (1  k) ma1 + (1  m)b1 + b2 [ ] 
  
V22 = k ma1 + (1  m)b1 + a2 [ ]+ (1  k) ma1 + (1  m)b1 + a2 [ ] 
  
V23 = k ma1 + (1  m)b1 + a2 [ ]+ (1  k) ma1 + (1  m)b1 + b2 [ ] 
  
V24 = ma1 + (1  m)b1 + a2 
  
V31 = k l"(a1 + a2)+ (1  l")(b1 + b2) [ ]+ (1  k)(b1 + b2) 
  
V32 = k l"(a1 + a2)+ (1  l")(b1 + b2) [ ]+ (1  k) ma1 + (1  m)b1 + b2 [ ] 
  
V33 = k ma1 + (1  m)b1 + a2) [ ]+ (1  k)(b1 + b2) 
  
V34 = k ma1 + (1  m)b1 + a2) [ ]+ (1  k) ma1 + (1  m)b1 + b2) [ ] 
 
The definitions of 
  
k, m, l, l', l",  and the sign restrictions on 
  
a1,b1, a2,b2 imply a number 




























The strategic analysis on Napoleon's side proceeds as follows. It is the case that: 
  
V14 >V13 and 
  
V12 >V11 iff  (*) 
  
a1 + a2  b1  b2
a1 + a2  b1  b2
> l, 
and:   42 
  
V13 >V11 iff (*') 
  
a1 + a2  b1  b2
a1 + a2  b1  b2
> l'. 
We assume both (*) and (*') to hold, thus ensuring that V11 = V1 is the security payoff of 
S1 (cf. fn. 30).  
By inspecting the definitional inequalities, we observe that V23 = V2 is the security payoff 
of S2 and that V31 = V3 is the security payoff of S3. 
 
Now to compare the three values V1, V2, V3. In view of (*'), the inequality V2 > V1 can be 
obtained from V2 > V13, which is equivalent to: 
  




m > k(1  ld)+ ld, with 
  
d =
a1  b1 + a2  b2
a1  b1
. 
This inequality makes sense only if the right-hand side is between 0 and 1, i.e., only if m 




which implies that l < 1. We impose these conditions (cf. fn. 31). Notice that (**) implies 
that m > k, a condition to which we return below.   
 






















  > k, a2 < a1  b1. 
We assume (***) to hold, as well as either (***') or (***") (cf. fn. 32). Hence, V2 is 
Napoleon's maxmin.  
 
Here are the computations on Blücher's side. From what has just been shown in the last 
paragraphs, -V2 is the security payoff of the conditional strategy B2B1. We will show that 
it is also the maxmin by checking that no other strategy can deliver a higher security 
payoff. 
 
Concerning B1B1: from definitional inequalities, the security payoff is either -V11 or -V21. 
It cannot be -V11 because V11 > V21 would imply a cycle, given that V21 > V2 > V13 > V11; 
so it is -V21, which cannot be the maxmin, given the first inequality in this sequence.  
Concerning B1B2: definitional inequalities entail -V12 or -V22 being the security payoff, 
but neither can be the maxmin because V22 > V2 holds (if -V22 is the security payoff, it 
falls below -V2, and the same if it is -V12, since this implies V12 >V22).   43 
Concerning B2B2: again from definitional inequalities, either -V14 or -V24 is the security 
payoff,  and  by  a  similar  argument,  V24  >  V2  precludes  either  value  from  being  the 
maxmin. 
Thus, we conclude that the equilibrium of the game, in the von Neumann-Morgenstern 
sense, is (S2, B2B1).  
 
A  Cournot-Nash  equilibrium  calculation  would  have  reached  the  same  conclusion 
somewhat  differently  and  more  quickly.  It  would  have  used  the  fact  that  Blücher's 
strategies B2B2 and B1B2 are dominated, respectively, by B2B1 and B1B1, once condition 
(*)  is  granted.  So  they  are  discarded  from  consideration  for  Napoleon  too,  and  his 
strategy  S3  becomes  dominated  by  S2  from  (***),  (***')  or  (***"),  and  definitional 
inequalities. The game is now 2x2, and the remaining conditions, i.e., (*'), (**), (**'), 
ensure that (S2, B2B1) is an equilibrium in the Cournot-Nash sense and that it is unique. 
 
As mentioned in the text, the assumption that l = 0 simplifies the analysis. Then, (*), (*'), 
(**') are trivially satisfied. The binding conditions are (***), (***') or (***"), and (**), 
which reduces to the straightforward inequality m > k. Thus, in this limiting case, the 
necessary condition becomes sufficient.  
 
Not all the probabilities can take extreme values. The conditions make it necessary that m 
> 0, l < 1 and k < 1, with k being further bounded from above and θ unrestrained between 
0  and  1,  or  alternatively  k  and  θ  being  mutually  related.  Notice  that  l"  is  the  least 
constrained parameter, being only subjected to the definitional inequalities l', m > l". 
  
It is trivial to find non-extreme values that satisfy all the conditions. For example, take as 
utility parameters: 
  
a1 =1,b1 =  1, a2 =1/2,b2 =  1/2,  =1/2, 
and as probability parameters: 
  
l = 0.1, l'=1/2, l"=1/3, k =1/3, m = 2/3.   44 
MAP OF THE OPERATIONS AS OF JUNE 17-18, 1815 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 